Margaret Thatcher liked to boast that her greatest achievement was the creation of New Labour. By this she meant the emergence of a labour party opposition that broadly accepted the supposed neoliberal consensus, the privatization of industry, the disempowerment of the trade unions, and the moral validity of militarism at home and abroad.

This, however, is a highly skewed perception of recent British political history. It could just as well be said the greatest catastrophe of the Thatcher years was the corruption of the Conservative Party, which turned in on itself and ceased to be the moderate right-of-center political grouping it once was, committed to defending the interests of business and the rich, but also broadly accepting of the basic tenets of social democracy, the need for greater equality, and the declining significance of the UK in a post-colonial more interconnected world.

The legacy of the Thatcher premiership forever riven by personal and ideological rivalries and inclined to unduly bitter and hawkish attacks on perceived adversaries began with the ignominy of the Iron Lady herself being ousted by her own party, and led to two decades of Tory-on-Tory ideological strife, assuaged only by the election of a nondescript but personable leader and the fears and necessities of coalition government. Strife, rancor and dissatisfaction are however still the principal undercurrents in conservative politics and the emergence of UKIP as a countervailing force is merely the latest manifestation of this ongoing failure of the conservative party to rally itself as a whole around broadly acceptable center ground. It is against this backdrop of a chronically fractured neoliberal-leaning right that all analyses of contemporary British politics should be viewed.

In Scotland, the political landscape has changed so much in the past 60 years that it cannot reasonably be described to have the same polity as England and Wales. In the 1950s, unionists and Conservatives dominated in Scotland and the idea of independence or even devolution was entertained only by an eccentric few. Since then, conservatism has waned in Scotland and under Thatcher and her successors shrank so drastically, that there is now only one Tory MP north of the border. In the 1980s the Scottish Nationalist Party cleverly positioned itself to the left of Labour in attacking neoliberalism and the Thatcher régime. Support for independence consequently grew, fuelled by the not unreasonable view that conservative English politics were being foisted upon the Scottish people against their will.

In 1997 Tony Blair’s new Labour administration granted Scotland and Wales their own parliaments and a much greater degree of self-government. The belief, at the time, was, that with no conservative opposition to speak of in these countries, Labour would dominate these devolved parliaments in perpetuity. Instead of this, what actually happened in Scotland, and to a lesser extent in Wales, was that the nationalist parties were strengthened as the main opposition to Labour and, in Scotland, succeeded in ousting Labour as the party of government, leading inevitably to the referendum on full independence that will take place on September 18th of this year.

As a lifelong Labour party supporter, I view the prospect of Scotland leaving the UK with some trepidation. In recent years, Labour has depended on its predominance in Scotland for seats in Westminster and there is a real danger that without these the party would never again be able to form a majority government in the rest of the UK.

However, the case—both moral and economic—for Scotland as a small independent nation, akin to Norway or Finland, is both compelling and longstanding, and should, in my view, trump any cynical party political considerations.

The history of Europe tends to focus on the wars and subsequent reconciliations that have ravaged its heartlands. The most successful parts of the continent, however, are those that have, for reason of secession, geographical isolation, treaty obligations, or accident of birth, opted out of this grand game.

Year upon year, tiny North European countries, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland dominate lists of the most livable societies. These are countries that have a deeply entrenched culture of social justice and that punch economically, politically, and militarily on the world stage way above their demographic weight. They have not achieved this by way of colonial ambitions, but by retreating into their homelands and consolidating their economies around the prudent exploitation of natural resources, social justice, a stern sense of morality, and a tenacious defense of the most basic human rights.

The social, financial and symbolic consequences of Scottish secession are largely imponderable. UK politics, to left and right, is carrying on in the blithe belief that it is unthinkable. That may well be wise. But the fact is that, whatever the result of the referendum, nearly 50% of Scottish citizens want to detach themselves from the United Kingdom and join the club of socially progressive North European nations. This is a desire that will surely one day be achieved.

Furthermore, fears of a Labour meltdown in England, should Scotland secede from the Union, may be somewhat exaggerated. No Labour government has ever depended solely on Scottish votes for its majority and there is no reason, especially given the parlous state of the Tory party and the implosion of the Liberal Democrats’ base of support, to imagine that the next one will be any exception. The Labour Victory may fall short of a landslide, but that, as 1997 and 2001 should have taught us, might not be such a bad thing.

It is true that in 2010, were it not for Labour’s persistent grip on many Scottish constituencies, David Cameron would have achieved a majority in the House of Commons and avoided the need to enter into coalition with the Liberal Democrats. But could the policies of such a one-party government have been any worse than those of the present one? In fact, the situation may have been less favorable for the Tories, since, without the stick of a slim coalition majority to beat them with, backbenchers may well have been much more inclined to rebel. Furthermore, Cameron would not have been forced into a fixed five-year marriage of convenience—something alien to the British parliamentary system and arguably incompatible with its democratic principles. As it stands, the government must drag on for five full years, come what may, simply because a minority coalition partner, with dwindling popular support, has been cowed into total submission. A slight Tory majority in 2010 might have already fallen to a vote of no-confidence, as unfavorable by-elections took their toll and disgruntled backbenchers defected to the far right.

Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that, were Scotland to secede from the UK in the next few years, the political landscape of both countries would change. The North of England and Wales, for example, would take on a much greater relative weight in the shrunken UK, leading to calls for greater devolution of powers to these regions, which may benefit Labour, as it did in Scotland in the 1980s.

An independent Scotland could, therefore, just as easily be perceived as a victory (both moral and actual) as a disaster for Labour. It would tell that a major portion of the old UK was so disillusioned with heavy-handed neoliberal policies emanating from London that it felt obliged to secede. That is pretty good rhetorical ammunition for any party seeking to unseat the Tories.
On achieving independence, the SNP would lose most of its raison d’être and Scotland would probably drift back to its natural social-democratic roots, while acting more effectively as a thorn in the side of any future right-wing government of the rest of the UK, showing how more socially progressive policies lead to greater equality and economic prosperity and a better quality of life.

Some yes voters in Scotland envisage precisely this scenario, viewing Alex Salmond as a buffoon, useful for drumming up redneck support for independence, but ultimately dispensable, once a post-Independence Scotland is turned back over to Scottish Labour Party rule.

None of this, however, to be honest, is likely to happen. While the polls show a late surge in the Yes vote, it is unlikely to top 50% of the population. The most probable outcome is one similar to that which occurred in Quebec in 1995, when the pro-Independence vote swelled dramatically in the final days before polling, but still lost out by 0.25% of a percentage point.
But one of the many refreshing features of the Scottish referendum is the fact that it doesn’t really matter who wins. It is not a zero sum game. Whatever the outcome, it will have been established that nearly half of the population are so dissatisfied with government from Westminster that they would rather take the (admittedly great) risk of secession. Of the half that voted for the Union, more than half (probably by a wide margin) are opposed to the current UK government and are banking on the Labour party returning to power at the next nationwide election.

If No prevails, the SNP will not entirely have lost its moment of glory, since further devolution to a nation, 50% of whose populace desires independence, is practically inevitable, whatever party prevails in Westminster. Its support, however, will surely wane and drift back to Labour, providing even greater Scottish ballast for a 2015 UK Labour government.

Scotland and the Labour Party win either way. And the very fact that a referendum is occurring at all provides yet further evidence of the extent to which the Conservative Party is still out of touch and in disarray.